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Abstract 
The concept of the ‘Europe of the regions’ has given rise to the question of whether there is a 
process of cultural unification discernible among European regions. This paper reports the results 
of  an  empirical  analysis  of  cultural  differences  among  a  panel  of  55  European  regions. 
Modernization  theorists  argue  that  cultural  convergence  can  be  expected,  whereas  culturalist 
theorists claim there are processes of path dependence. Using existing measures of culture we 
find  that  economic  development  is  an  important  driver  for  value  change,  but  that  cultural 
(religious) heritage leaves a permanent imprint. In addition our results suggest that historical 
shocks influence the process of cultural change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The extensive deliberations over the draft constitution and the breakdown of the Brussels summit, 
which was meant to adopt a new constitutional treaty for the European Union, has led to the 
umpteenth crisis in the history of European integration. The proximal cause of the collapse was a 
political row about voting rights. Some commentators have, however, pointed to the overriding 
importance of a distal cause, continuing cultural diversity. When Mr. Giscard d’Estaing and his 
12-strong presidium issued the first 16 articles of the draft constitution in early 2003, they were 
deluged with over 1,000 proposed amendments from all sides. These amendments revealed the 
great discord and the many difficulties that must be overcome before the dream of Europe as a 
real constitutional unity can come true. 
  Whether these difficulties will be overcome is hotly debated. On the one hand there are 
European zealots who argue that European unity should not only be economic in nature, but also 
political  and  cultural.  Cultural  convergence  is  in  their  opinion  not  only  desirable  but  also 
inevitable, at least in the end. Modernisation theory provides material for voicing such a far-
reaching expectation. On the other hand there are European sceptics who argue that although in 
the foreseeable future the single market will be deepened an enlarged Europe will still politically 
resemble General de Gaulle’s l’Europe des états and will culturally be dominated by a diversity 
of national heritages. Culturalist theory provides arguments for this expectation.    
There  is  one  gap  in  the  debate  between  European  zealots  and  sceptics,  that  we  find 
intriguing  and  want  to  fill.  Both  sides  in  the  debate  point  either  to  international  or  national 
influences, modernisation processes and cultural heritages respectively, and neglect the regional 
dimension. In our opinion the regional dimension is of more than passing importance if one 
wants to gain insight into the process of the cultural and political unification of Europe. Both the   2 
modern history of Europe and the emphasis in today’s European policy making on the principle 
of subsidiarity point in that direction. 
 
The national and regional dimension in modern European history 
 
What are the historical reasons for our claim that the regional dimension should not be neglected? 
One has to realise that neither nation states nor national cultures exist at all times and in all 
circumstances.  They  are  a  contingency,  and  not  a  universal  necessity  (GELLNER,  1983). 
Regions predated the rise of the nation state and had an impact on how particular nation states 
took shape. The characteristics of modern nation states as well as national cultures are chiefly 
products of 19th century Europe and – according to modernisation theory - a by-product of the 
industrial and commercial revolutions. The decline of older regional and ethnic bonds made it 
imperative at that time to formulate and inculcate new forms of civic loyalty such as nationalism 
and  patriotism.  According  to  HOBSBAWN  (1990)  states  and  regimes  had  every  reason  to 
reinforce their position with the sentiments and symbols of ‘imagined communities’. They spread 
the  image  and  heritage  of  the  ‘nation’  and  tried  to  inculcate  attachment  to  it  by  ‘invented 
traditions’. This does not mean, however, that national bonds and cultures eclipsed regional ones 
completely.  In  some countries regions  constituted an  obstacle  to centralised  state  and nation 
building, and remained an element in the polity and culture of these countries. In these countries 
unification happened only at the end of the 19th century (Germany, Italy). In other countries 
nation  building  started  much  earlier  than  the  19th  century  (France,  Great-Britain,  the 
Netherlands). If the emergence of nation states and national cultures has been a by-product of the 
modernisation  process,  then  most  countries  have  followed  different  roads  to  modernity  (cf.   3 
GREENFIELD, 1992). And each road has left at least some elbowroom for regional politics and 
culture to have an impact on whatever is happening in economy and society.  
 
The national and regional dimension in today’s European policymaking 
 
Paradoxically  the  leeway  for  regional  politics  and  culture  has  recently  increased  because  of 
ongoing  modernisation  processes,  such  as  economic  integration  and  globalisation.  OHMAE 
(1995), for example, has argued that functional imperatives at the global and European level are 
breaking down nation states in favour of regional entities. Globalisation and European integration 
have made some territorially based production factors (especially with regard to Fordist large 
scale, standardised modes of production for national markets) become less important, enhancing 
the freedom of firms to choose locations at will. At the same time, however, ‘new’ regional 
production factors – such as the availability of not only human, but also cultural and social capital 
– have become of critical importance (especially for post-Fordist small scale, flexible modes of 
production  for  global  markets).  Therefore  a  time  of  globalisation  and  European  integration 
became also a time of resurgence of regional economies. 
  The European Commission took advantage of this trend by extending the subsidiarity 
principle  to  what  it  called  l’Europe  des  regions.  This  idea  refers  to  a  geographically 
decentralised,  economically  competitive  and  politically  pluralist  Europe  that  does  not  only 
culturally  draw  upon  European  and  national  identities,  but  also  on  regional  ones  (cf. 
NEWLANDS, 1995). In praise of this conception BOVENBERG (2003) has argued that although 
European integration does require some convergence to a homogeneous set of public core values, 
cultural  diversity  has  advantages  too.  Cultural  pluralism  at  the  national  and  regional  levels 
increases the potential for intra-European trade and allows Europe to benefit from the specific   4 
strengths  of  national  and  regional  traditions.  The  internal  market  encourages  each  region  to 
increasingly specialise in its comparative advantages, which are in part shaped by its specific 
social and cultural capital. CASTELLS (1996, 1998) argues more or less in the same vein. To 
make the European Union even more of a success the legitimacy of the European institutions 
must be enhanced. The key element in gradually establishing the European Union’s legitimacy, 
without jeopardising its policymaking capacity, is the ability of its institutions to link up with 
subnational  levels  of  government,  regional  and  local.  This  feat  can  be  accomplished  by  a 
deliberate extension of the subsidiarity principle, under which the Union institutions only take 
charge  of  decisions  that  lower  levels  of  government,  including  nation  states,  cannot  assume 
effectively. This adds dynamism to regions and cities around Europe. Both cities and regions 
have already established European networks that co-ordinate initiative, and learn from each other, 
putting into action a novel principle of co-operation and competition. In this way the European 
Union becomes a network society in statu nascendi, which is a highly dynamic, open system, 





The  above  mentioned  arguments  put  the  debate  between  European  zealots  and  sceptics, 
modernisation  theorists  and  culturalist  about  a  unifying  Europe  in  a  new  light.  The  pivotal 
question we want to answer in this paper is whether as modernisation theory predicts a process of 
cultural unification has been going on within Europe in the past decade. We realize that this 
question is neither original nor under- researched. What is, however, original in our approach and 
has  never  been  researched  before  is  the  regional  dimension  of  this  hypothesized  cultural   5 
convergence across Europe. What we intend to do in this paper is to study the cultural aspects of 
a ‘Europe of the regions’. We will look for changing and continuing cultural differences across 
European regions. How can  we  explain these  differences?  Is  convergence discernible, as the 
European  zealots  and  modernisation  theorists  assume,  and  will  regional  cultural  differences 
therefore  eventually  fade  away?  Or  will,  as  the  European  sceptics  and  culturalists  suppose, 
important cultural differences between European regions be preserved and will a ‘Europe of the 
regions’ stay as culturally heterogeneous as it is today?   
The outline of the paper is as follows. First we sketch the ideas from modernisation and 
culturalist theories that are relevant for answering our research questions. Next we elucidate the 
measurement of the basic cultural dimensions we distinguish and the data we use. Then we show 
that  regions  in  Europe  differ  considerably  on  these  basic  dimensions  and  we  use  regression 
analysis in order to explain value differences across European regions. Finally, we present our 
conclusions.  
 




The  crucial  notion  within  modernisation  theory  is  that  the  most  important  development  in 
European history has been the transition from tradition to modernity, which has had far reaching 
consequences  for  the  value  patterns  Europeans  cherish  today.  In  the  boldest  and  most 
informative,  but  therefore  also  most  vulnerable  version  of  modernisation  theory  the  crucial 
independent variable in the causal model is the industrialisation process (KERR et al., 1960; 
KERR,  1983;  MOORE,  1963).  The  argument  goes  as  follows.  Due  to  the  industrialisation   6 
process the division of labour has increased in all European countries in the last two centuries. 
The  emergence  and  spread  of  national  and  international  markets  has  continued  and  even 
accelerated. Further commercialisation of economic life has taken place. There has been a general 
enlargement of economic scale. Economic growth has seemed to drag on endlessly. The number 
of persons working in agriculture has continually decreased. 
  Intrinsic  in  the  industrialisation  process  is,  according  to  modernisation  theory,  an 
irreversible commitment to technical and economic rationality. The logic of industrial society 
imposes technical and economic rationality not only on the work place but also on all other 
spheres of society in a gradual but unremitting and persuasive way. Thus it enforces features that 
are functionally consistent with rationality and undermines those that are not. As a result all 
industrial societies will be brought on to convergent developmental paths. The place a particular 
society  starts  from,  and  the  route  it  follows,  is  likely  to  affect  its  features  for  many  years. 
However, all industrialising societies will respond to the inherent logic of industrialism itself. 
Consequently,  any  differences  between  industrial  societies  should  eventually  disappear  as 
economic development continues.  
  Why should the modernisation process in general and industrialisation in particular lead 
to new ‘rationalistic’ value patterns? The answer is that it is the force of industrial circumstances, 
the inherent logic of industrialism that persuades people to adhere to ‘rationalistic’ opinions, 
ideas and values. Because this force is generally the same for everyone and similar in strength, 
consensus originates from it. The underlying theory is simple (INKELES, 1960). It is assumed 
that people have experiences, develop attitudes, and form values in response to the forces or 
pressures which their environment creates. The theory holds that, within broad limits, the same 
situational pressures, the same framework for living, will be experienced as similar and  will 
generate the same or similar response by people from different countries. The core proposition   7 
goes as follows: In so far as industrialisation, urbanisation and the development of large-scale 
bureaucratic  structures  and  their  usual  accompaniments  create  a  standard  environment  with 
standard,  institutional  pressures  for  particular  groups,  to  that  degree  they  should  produce 




Although  modernisation  theory  has  provided  some  stimulating  insights  into  the  cultural 
similarities and differences observed across European countries, it was not capable to explain all 
or even a great part of the variation. Culturalist theory took over. It argued that cross-national 
differences and similarities in basic values are to a large extent the products of each country’s 
unique  trajectory  of  social  development,  its  historical  heritage,  and  cultural  experiences  and 
traditions (BAILEY, 1992). Today these cultural factors are often interpreted in terms of path 
dependence.  Complex value patterns often display increasing returns to adoption in that the more 
they are adopted, the more experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved. 
Because the relative benefits of existing value patterns compared with ‘new’ patterns increases 
over time the probability of further steps along the same path increases with each move down that 
path (PIERSON, 2000). Therefore culturalists speak of path dependence. Path dependence means 
that the past has a grip on the present and the present has a grip on the future. In other words, 
history matters (NORTH, 1990). That does not mean that value patterns are preordained, but that 
today’s and tomorrow’s cultural options are constrained by earlier developments. And earlier 
events matter much more than later ones. These events have paved the path for today’s cultures. 
The longer a particular cultural path has been followed that is characteristic of a certain region or 
nation-state, the more difficult it becomes to leave this path. Path dependent cultural processes   8 
will  often  be  most  powerful  not  at  the  level  of  individuals,  but  at  a  more  macro-level  that 
involves complementary configurations of individuals and institutions, i.e., regions and nation-
states. The length of the pedigree of a culture is of course not the only factor that determines the 
degree of path dependence. Some cultures are more effective and efficient than others in the 
formation of people’s interests and identities necessary for their continuation. Variations in path 
dependence also reflect differences in the extent to which cultures have been subject to external 
pressures for change. Effectiveness and efficiency reinforce path dependence, external pressure 




Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) has suggested that several amendments are necessary if 
value researchers want to continue working with modernization theory. The first amendment is 
that humankind has entered a new historical stage, that of post-modernity or post-industrialism. 
This new stage is not only accompanied by new technological developments (information and 
communication  technology)  and  economic  changes  (globalization  of  markets,  flexibility  of 
work), but it also brings new values, particularly post-materialistic rather than materialistic ones. 
The second one is that we must not focus all our attention on long-term developments, but that 
we also need to take into consideration short-term changes, such as the different phases of the 
business cycle, and short term events, such as wars and revolutions. A third amendment is that we 
must incorporate in modernization theory the theoretical notion of path dependency. This implies 
that although the direction of change may be common in various societies, each society develops 
according  to  its  own  speed  and  in  distinctive  way  reflecting  a  society’s  social-cultural 
experiences and historical heritage. ‘Economic development tends to push societies in a common   9 
direction, but rather than converging, they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their 
cultural heritage’ (INGLEHART and BAKER, 2000: 49).  
Although  INGLEHART  and  BAKER  (2000)  join  in  with  both  modernisation  and 
culturalist  theory  they  also  react  against  the  deterministic  character  of  these  theories.  Their 
central  thesis  is  that  economic  development  has  systematic,  and  to  some  extent,  predictable 
cultural and political consequences. These consequences are, however, not iron laws of history, 
but probabilistic trends. In other words, the probability is high that certain changes will occur as 
societies economically develop, but the question of whether they occur and if so, to what degree 
and  in  which  form  depends  on  the  specific  cultural  and  historical  context  of  the  society  in 
question. Economic development brings cultural changes, but a history of Catholic, Protestant, 
Orthodox, Islamic or any other religious tradition gives rise to cultural zones that persist after 
controlling for the effects of economic development.  
As far as economic development is concerned INGLEHART and BAKER (2000) argue, 
following  BELL  (1973),  that  three  generic  types  of  economies-cum-societies  can  be 
distinguished. In pre-industrial, agrarian societies life was a game against nature. In industrial 
societies dependence on nature became diminished due to technical progress and the systematic 
organization of work. In post-industrial societies services became dominant and life became a 
game between persons. These three ‘ideal typical’ societies went hand in hand with three ‘ideal 
typical’ value patterns. To tap these value patterns Inglehart and Baker distinguish two basic 
dimensions  to  measure  cultural  differences.  They  label  these  dimensions  respectively  the 
Traditional/rational  and  the  Survival/self-expression  dimension.  The  Traditional/rational 
dimension reflects a value system in which people at the pre-industrial, traditional pole of this 
dimension  reject  divorce,  emphasize  the  importance  of  God,  support  deference  to  authority, 
seldom discuss politics and have high levels of national pride. At the industrial, rational pole of   10 
this dimension opposite values are emphasized. The second dimension Survival/self-expression 
taps values that emerge in a post-industrial society with high levels of security. According to 
Inglehart, a central component of this dimension involves the difference between (pre)industrial, 
materialist  and  post-industrial,  post-materialist  values.  This  component  measures  the  relative 
priority that is given to economic and physical security over self-expression and quality of life.  
 
EXPLAINING VALUE DIFFERENCES ACROSS EUROPEAN REGIONS 
 
If one wants to take modern European history and contemporary European social policy making 
seriously, then it is not a foregone conclusion that an empirical test of the convergence hypothesis 
should take nation states as the only aggregate level variable. Regions within the same nation 
state often differ in their stage and pace of economic development. Regions also differ sometimes 
in their cultural heritages. Although the most common sources of these heritages, religions and 
languages,  often  follow  the  boundaries  of  nation  states,  sometimes  religious  and  language 
divisions became identified with regions within nation states (KEATING, 1998).  
We  measure  culture  along  two basic  dimensions  developed  by  Inglehart as  described 
earlier. Data are taken from the European Value Studies (EVS). This survey comprises three 
waves (1981/1990/1999), of which we use the second and third. We did not use the first wave 
that was carried out in 1981, because of data limitations. The dataset comprises 8 countries, i.e. 
France, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Great-Britain. In order 
to compare the data on basic values with regional economic data we used the Eurostat definition 
of  regions.  The  regional  level in  our analyses  is  the  NUTS1 level.  This implies  that  France 
consists  of  8  regions,  Italy  11  (including  Sicily  and  Sardinia),  Germany  11  (former  eastern 
regions  excluded),  Spain  7,  Portugal  1  (excluding  Azores  and  Madeira),  The  Netherlands  4,   11 
Belgium  3,  and  Great-Britain  10  (including  Scotland,  excluding  Northern  Ireland).  The  total 
number of regions equals 55. We have calculated the two dimensions for these 55 regions in 1990 
and 1999.  
In table 1 we summarise the items that are included in our two dimensions. INGLEHART 
and BAKER (2000) extensively discuss the correlation of other items that are included in the 
European Values Study but not included in the dimensions in table 1
i. Their conclusion is that the 
dimensions  as  defined tap  a broad  dimension  of cross-cultural  variation  involving  dozens  of 
additional  variables.  The  two  dimensions  therefore  reflect  basic  cultural  characteristics  of  a 
society. 
 
<Insert table 1 about here> 
 
 
Based on the above items we calculated the two dimensions for each region in each year for 
which we have data, i.e. 1990 and 1999. Due to the inclusion of an additional item in the British 
survey  it  is  not  possible  to  measure  the  values  for  Great-Britain  on  the  second  dimension 
(survival/self  expression)  in  1999
ii.  A  graphical  representation  of  the  scores  of the  European 
regions in 1990 is presented below
iii. This regional analysis of 8 countries can be interpreted as a 
magnification of part of the analysis of INGLEHART and BAKER (2000) of 65 societies in the 
world. The relative position of the countries in our figure 1 correspond with the relative positions 
of these same countries in the figures at world scale as presented and discussed by INGLEHART 
and BAKER (2000). Figure 1 reveals significant intra-country differences.  
 
<Insert figure 1 about here> 
 
   12 
Hence,  in  line  with  our  theoretical  arguments  presented  before,  values  differ  not  only 
considerably across nations, but also across regions. German and Dutch regions score relatively 
high on both dimensions, Germany scores higher on the Traditional/rational dimension, and the 
Netherlands score relatively high on the Survival/self-expression dimension. British, Belgian and 
French regions are in the middle. The southern European regions of Italy, Portugal and Spain 
score  consistently  lower  on  both  dimensions.  Large  regional  differences  in  values  within  a 
European country can be found in Italy. They follow roughly the North-South divide. Another 
example is the large difference between Hamburg and Saarland in Germany. 
As described above, Inglehart’s thesis is that value differences can be explained both by 
differences in welfare levels as well as cultural heritage. In order to test simultaneously for the 
influence of economic development and cultural heritage we perform a regression analysis. Table 
2 summarises our regression results of cross-regional differences in Traditional/rational values 
and Survival/self-expression values as measured in 55 European regions. As we have calculated 
the dimensions in 1990 and 1999 the number of panel observations is 110. The level of economic 
development has been measured by Gross Regional Products (GRP) and is based on Eurostat 
information. We use data on economic development preceding the years for which we want to 
explain cultural differences. The years we use for the two time periods are 1977, respectively 
1990. In order to test if these years are possible biases in terms of GRP, we also tested the 
correlation  with  the  5-year  average  in  which  the  two  chosen  years  fall  in  between.  As  the 
correlation was over .99 we feel safe to claim that a bias in measurement of level of economic 
development is not to be expected.  
 
<Insert table 2 about here> 
   13 
With  respect  to  cultural  heritage  we  follow  INGLEHART  and  BAKER  (2000)  and 
measure cultural heritage by including a dummy for religious past. In the European case this 
choice is binomial, namely protestant or catholic
iv. We labelled Great-Britain and the northern 
German  and  Dutch  regions  as  protestant.  The  dummy  takes  the  value  1  if  a  region  has  a 
protestant heritage.  
The panel allows us to test if there is perhaps a period-specific effect that has influenced 
the development of values. The period-specific dummy takes the value 1 in the second period 
(t=2). Hence, a negative coefficient of the period-specific effect would imply that a downward 
correction on the dependent variable is needed in the second period, which is the 1990s.  
The basic model we estimate is presented in column 1 (traditional/rational) and column 2 
(survival/self-expression)  of  table  2.  In  addition  to  these  default  models  we  have  estimated 
several  alternative  regression  models.  We  test  for  the  inclusion  of  country  specific  effects 
(column  3-4),  replacing  GRP  per  capita  by  sectoral  employment  shares
v  (column  5-6)  and 
alternative measures for path dependency (column 7-8). But we first describe the results of the 
default model. 
As  expected  the  level  of  economic  development  is  an  important  explanatory  variable 
when explaining differences in value systems. Both on the Traditional/rational dimension and 
the Survival/self-expression dimension GRP per capita has a significant and positive effect. Our 
measure  of  cultural  heritage,  the  religious  past  of  a  region,  is  significantly  related  to  the 
differences  in  values  across  European  regions.  In  line  with  the  results  of  INGLEHART  and 
BAKER  (2000),  a  protestant  heritage  is  positively  related  to  both  cultural  dimensions.  The 
period-specific effect taking the value 1 on t=2 is only significant when explaining cross-regional 
differences on the second dimension, i.e. Survival/self-expression. The positive significant result 
implies that an upward correction is needed in the 1990s compared to the period before when   14 
explaining the variation in the Survival/self-expression dimension. This indicates that apparently 
Europeans  have  experienced  some  kind  of  a  shock in  the  1990s, which  changed  their  value 
pattern in the direction of more post-modern values.  
As mentioned before, we test for alternative regression models. We first test if the results 
with respect to economic development, cultural heritage and the period-specific effect are robust 
to the inclusion of country-specific characteristics. We have taken the most populous European 
country Germany as the country of reference. This means that a significant positive country-
specific effect of for example Spain would imply that an upward correction is needed for Spain 
compared to Germany for the specific dependent variable
vi. The results are shown in table 2. 
Interestingly, the protestant dummy is not significant once we control for country-specific effects. 
This suggests that Inglehart and Baker are right when arguing that ‘given religious traditions have 
historically  shaped  the  national  culture  of  given  societies,  but  that  today  their  impact  is 
transmitted through nationwide institutions, to the population of that society as a whole – even to 
those who have little or no contact with religious institutions’ (INGLEHART and BAKER, 2000, 
p.  36).  Indeed,  our  results  suggest  that  the  regional  differences  within  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands in terms of protestant or catholic tradition are not so strong to significantly differ 
from national characteristics once we control for the latter.  
Next we include sectoral employment shares instead of GRP per capita, resulting in a 
significant  relationship  between  size  of  the  industry  and  the  traditional/rational  dimension, 
respectively, the service sector and the survival/self-expression dimension. As GRP per capita 
and sectoral structure are interrelated this result is not surprising. Nevertheless, the explained 
variance in the traditional/rational dimension decreases from .37 in the default model (column 1) 
to .11 in case the size of the industrial sector is included (column 5). The reason for the worse 
model fit may be caused by the fact that the relationship between size of the industrial sector in   15 
terms of employment and the GRP per capita is not a linear one (CHENERY, 1960; FEINSTEIN, 
1999).  
Finally we test alternative measures for path dependency by including information on 
legal origin. As shown by LAPORTA et al. (1998) countries have different legal origins which 
leaves a permanent imprint on the legal environment today. Legal scholars have identified four 
major legal families: Scandinavian Civil Law, French Civil Law, English Common Law and 
German Civil Law (see KUNT and LEVINE, 2001). In the sample most countries have a French 
legal  origin.  The  exceptions  are  Germany  and  Great-Britain.  In  our  sample  of  regions,  this 
implies  we  include  dummies  for  the  English  and  German  legal  origin  versus  regions  with  a 
French legal origin. The results in table 2 suggest that regions with English legal heritage are – 
ceteris paribus - relatively traditional compared with countries that have a French legal heritage. 
A German legal heritage results – ceteris paribus – in more rational values. It corresponds with 
the position of the regions as depicted in figure 1 and can be seen as an interpretation of the 
country specific effects as estimated in models 3 and 4. German regions score high on the first 
dimension which is reflected in a significant effect of our variable measuring a German legal 
origin (model 7) and negative and significant country-specific effects in model 3. A similar line 
of reasoning holds for the relatively low score on the first dimension of the British regions.  
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The process of European integration has resulted in a considerable body of policymaking on the 
so-called ‘Europe of the regions’, meaning that much development will take place on the regional 
level. In this paper we have focused on the explanation of value patterns and differences in values 
between European regions. The explanation of value differences is particularly interesting against   16 
the background of a unifying Europe and the idea of a ‘Europe of the regions’. The question we 
tried  to  answer  in  this  paper  is  whether  we  can  speak  of  cultural  unification  in  Europe. 
Theoretically,  two  extreme  points  of  view  exist.  Modernization  theorists  predict  cultural 
convergence,  whereas  culturalists  on  the  other  hand  argue  that  cultural  differences  between 
European regions are path dependent. Inglehart has suggested a synthetic theory in which these 
two  extremes  are  combined.  According  to  Inglehart,  modernization  theorists  are  right  when 
arguing that economic development tends to push societies in a common direction, but rather than 
converging they seem to move on parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritage. 
Using  a  panel  of  55  European  regions  and  scores  on  two  basic  cultural  dimensions 
(traditional/rational and survival/self expression) in 1990 and 1999 we have attempted to explain 
value differences between European regions. Though at a world scale the 8 countries in our 
sample  may  be  culturally  close,  a  regional  breakdown  of  the  cultural  dimensions  suggests 
considerable  regional  differences  within  these  8  countries.  Our  regression  analysis  and  the 
robustness tests show that modernization, i.c. economic development, is an important driver of 
value change in these regions, but also that there are cultural processes of path dependency at 
work. In our analysis we proxied historical heritage by protestant or catholic historical tradition 
and legal origin. In addition, our results suggest that Europeans have experienced some shock in 
terms of the Surivival/self-expression dimension in the 1990s. In sum, based on our sample of 
European regions we find empirical support for the theoretical synthesis of modernization and 
culturalist  theory  as  proposed  by  Inglehart.  With  respect  to  our  initial  research  question  on 
cultural convergence in European regions our results suggest that (further) convergence is to be 
expected, but also that path dependence leaves a permanent imprint
vii. Our panel allowed us to 
recognize the importance of period-shocks and in addition we have used alternative measures for   17 
path dependency. However, despite the novelty of our regional empirical analysis of cultural 
convergence in Europe a number of limitations remain. 
One shortcoming of our analysis is the fact that we have measured culture along two basic 
dimensions  as  developed  by  Inglehart.  Though  thoroughly  tested  (see  INGLEHART  and 
BAKER, 2000) the question remains whether this instrument is a sufficient measure for such a 
complex concept as culture. It would be interesting to perform a similar analysis using alternative 
measures of culture, such as those developed by HOFSTEDE (2001) or SCHWARTZ (1992). 
Unfortunately, cross-national surveys that used these measures do not contain data at the level of 
regions within European countries. 
Another  limitation  concerns  the  period-specific  effect  in  the  1990s  on  one  of  our 
dimensions that describe basic values, the Survival/self-expression dimension. It remains to be 
seen  whether  this  shock  will  have  only  temporary  effects  on  this  dimension  or  will  have  a 
permanent character. Using data of the next wave of EVS (planned for 2008) may shed new light 
on this. Our current results only allow us to make a crude guess what may have caused this shock 
effect. Broad societal developments like the New Economy hype at the end of the 1990s, the 
adoption of the single currency in Europe and – perhaps most important - the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and ‘the end of history’ (FUKUYAMA, 1992) may have resulted in an optimistic 
view on the future and may have subsequently resulted in this period-specific effect on basic 
value differences across European regions in the 1990s. Our data do not allow us to substantiate 
these conjectures at this moment. 
Thirdly, the test of modernization theory was limited to only one indicator, i.c. the level of 
economic development as measured by GDP. Applying a multiple indicator approach will be a 
step forward. Although GDP has proven to be the best single indicator in previous research there 
is a problem in our case. Our sample of European regions is confined to the upper end of regional   18 
GDPs at a world scale
viii. This implies that one should be careful in interpreting and generalizing 
our results as a ‘strong’ test of modernization theory. 
Fourthly,  we  looked  only  at  religion  and  legal  origin  as  indicators  of  cultural  path 
dependence. To gain a better insight into the historical borderlines on the map of European values 
we  need  a  better  understanding  of  the  complex  history  of  shifting  fault  lines.  According  to 
DAVIES (1996) the most obvious dividing lines are the ones that separate Western from Eastern 
Europe (Eastern vs. Western Roman Empire, Orthodox vs. Latin Christendom, Communism vs. 
Capitalism)  and  Northern  and  Southern  Europe  (the  line  of  the  Roman  limes,  Romance  vs. 
Germanic  languages).  The  extension  of  the  European  Union  to  the  East  in  2004  and  the 
availability of both EVS and other regional data for a larger part of Europe will increase the 
feasibility of more encompassing and in-depth analyses. 
Finally, our analysis has been performed at the aggregate level. To fully understand the 
changes in the regional scores on the two dimensions, it might be fruitful to perform an in-depth 
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Figure 1: scores of European regions on two cultural dimensions in 1990 
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BE1  23 
Explanation of NUTS 1 codes in figure 1 
 
 
Region  NUTS1 
code 
  Region  NUTS 1 code 
1  Reg. Bruxelles-Cap.  BE1  29  Méditerranée  FR8 
2  Vlaanderen  BE2  30  Nord Ovest  IT1 
3  Wallonie  BE3  31  Lombardia  IT2 
4  Baden-Württemberg  DE1  32  Nord Est  IT3 
5  Bayern  DE2  33  Emilia-Romagna  IT4 
6  Berlin  DE3  34  Centro  IT5 
7  Bremen  DE5  35  Lazio  IT6 
8  Hamburg  DE6  36  Ambruzzo-Molise  IT7 
9  Hessen  DE7  37  Campania  IT8 
10  Niedersachsen  DE9  38  Sud  IT9 
11  Nordrhein-Westfalen  DEA  39  Sicilia  ITA 
12  Rheinland-Pfalz  DEB  40  Sardegna  ITB 
13  Saarland  DEC  41  Noord-Nederland  NL1 
14  Schleswig-Holstein  DEF  42  Oost-Nederland  NL2 
15  Noroeste  ES1  43  West-Nederland  NL3 
16  Noreste  ES2  44  Zuid-Nederland  NL4 
17  Madrid  ES3  45  Portugal Continente  PT1 
18  Centro  ES4  46  North  UK1 
19  Este  ES5  47  Yorkshire and Humberside  UK2 
20  Sur  ES6  48  East Midlands  UK3 
21  Canarias  ES7  49  East Anglia  UK4 
22  Île de France  FR1  50  South East  UK5 
23  Bassin Parisien  FR2  51  South West  UK6 
24  Nord-Pas-de-Calais  FR3  52  West Midlands  UK7 
25  Est  FR4  53  North West  UK8 
26  Ouest  FR5  54  Wales  UK9 
27  Sud-Ouest  FR6  55  Scotland  UKA 
28  Centre-Est  FR7       
 




Traditional values emphasize the following: 
 
•  God is very important in respondent’s life 
•  Respondent has a strong sense of national pride 
•  Respondent favours more respect for authority 
•  Divorce is never justifiable 
•  Respondent almost never discusses political matters 
 




Survival values emphasize the following: 
 
•  Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over 
self-expression and quality of life 
•  Respondent describes him/her self as not very happy 
•  Respondent describes him/her self as not very satisfied with life 
•  Homosexuality is never justifiable 
•  Respondent’s feel one has to be very careful in trusting people 
   
(Self-expression values emphasize the opposite) 
Source: Inglehart and Baker (2000).  
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Table 2: Regression results of two cultural dimensions on independent variables measuring economic development,  











































































           
Gross  Regional 
Product (/1000) 
.015 (.0022)**  .003 (.001)*  .008 (.001)**  .0056 (.001)**  -  -  .009 (.001)**  .003 (.0015)* 
Historically 
protestant (=1) 
.035 (.017)*  .084 (.018)**  .018 (.033)  -.002 (.016)  .059 (.021)**  .079 (.017)**  .068 (.024)**  .106 (.027)** 
Period-specific 
effect  (2nd  period 
(90s)= 1) 
-.011 (-.015)  .032 (.014)*  0.002 (.011)  .024 (.009)**  .016 (.019)  .039 (.013)**  .000 (.013)  .028 (.015)* 
Netherlands  -  -  -.03 (.025)  .18 (.015)**  -  -  -  - 
Spain  -  -  -.13 (.031)**  .002 (.019)  -  -  -  - 
Portugal  -  -  -.18 (.048)**  -.11 (.018)**  -  -  -  - 
Great-Britain  -  -  -.15 (.030)**  .048 (.016)**  -  -  -  - 
Belgium  -  -  -.12 (.027)**  -.0009 (.029)  -  -  -  - 
France  -  -  -.08 (.027)**  -.053 (.015)**  -  -  -  - 
Italy  -  -  -.19 (.027)**  -.03 (.016)  -  -  -  - 
Employment in  
industry 
-  -  -  -  .33 (.15)*  -  -  - 
Employment in  
service  
-  -  -  -  -  .17 (.07)*  -  - 
Legal origin: G  -  -  -  -  -  -  .110 (.024)**  -.027 (.021) 



















Note: White corrected standard errors between parentheses; * indicates 5% significance, ** indicates 1% significance. For explanation of variable legal origin: see main text.   25 
ENDNOTES 
                                                 
i It is important to note that the WVS dataset used by Inglehart and the EVS used by us have much in common, but 
are also to some extent different. WVS comprises not only the European countries of EVS, but also a large number 
of other Western and non-Western countries. It should be mentioned however, that the majority of the survey 
questions in EVS and WVS are exactly the same. 
 
ii This is the reason for the difference in number of observation in our regression analysis (100 for survival/self-
expression versus 110 in the estimation of the traditional rational dimension). 
 
iii The figure with the 1999 scores shows a similar pattern. 
 
iv Though we acknowledge that for example the southern regions of Spain have been under Islamic influence before 
the 14
th  century. Nevertheless it is clear that Catholicism shaped Spain in the subsequent centuries. 
 
v We are grateful to one of the reviewers for pointing this out. 
 
vi It is important to stress that significant country dummies do not imply that these countries have some specific 
features. It only shows that they differ on a specific dimension compared to the country of reference (i.e Germany). 
 
vii Building on the estimated coefficients of our regression analysis we tried to shed some light on value convergence 
in European regions. Allowing for catching-up economic growth by assuming that poorer regions would grow faster 
and obtain similar levels of welfare as richer regions, we calculated the scores on the two cultural dimensions in 
2020. As logically follows from our statistical model, the path dependencies limit the degree of convergence 
considerably. In other words, it would take a very long period (and perhaps even unrealistic assumptions) to allow 
for complete value convergence in Europe. The statistical results are available upon request. 
 
viii We are grateful to one of the reviewers for pointing this out. 